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NATIONAL GA Y TASK FORCE V. BOARD OF EDUCA TION
OF OKLAHOMA CITY
INTRODUCTION
Homosexual teachers have looked to the American court system for two
types of relief: (1) protection against employment discrimination based upon
their status as homosexuals; and (2) protection against reprimands for voicing
an opinion on the topic of homosexuality.' Until the last quarter century, it has
been as if teachers gave up their first amendment rights2 when they received
their teaching certificates.3
The National Gay Task Force (NGTF) looked to the courts for relief in
challenging an Oklahoma statute which attempted to regulate teachers'
speech. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City4
marks the first time since the beginning of the gay rights movement that the
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to a case which had homo-
sexuality as its central issue.' The result in National Gay Task Force6 has left
'Lavine, Free Speech. Rights of Homosexual Teachers, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (1980) (hereinafter
cited as Lavine). This note discusses balancing teachers' right to free speech against the state's interest in
regulating teachers' speech.
'U.S. CONST. amend. 1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."; Keyshian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (Faculty members of a New York State University were reinstated after having
been dismissed for refusing to certify that they were not communists); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968) (A teacher was fired after publicly commenting upon the Board of Education's method of fund
raising. The Supreme Court recognized the right of teachers to formulate and publicly announce opinions
regarding public issues without fear of dismissal. The proper balance is a "balance between the interests of a
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.") Id. at 568:
Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Three students protested the Viet Nam War
by wearing black armbands, even though this violated school rules. The students were suspended. The Court
recognized that "it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.") Id at 506.
'See generally, Lavine, supra note I; Stevens, Balancing Speech and Efficiency: The Educator's Freedom of
Expression after Pickering, 8 J.L. & EDuc. 223 (1979). This note discusses the harmonization of teachers' in-
terest of free speech and the state's interest of regulating teachers' speech since Pickering; Kusma, First
Amendment Rights and Teacher Dismissal: A Survey, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 392 (1977). This note discusses
the limitations of teachers' first amendment rights.
'729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 105 S.Ct. 1858 (1985).
'The case of Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (1984), cert. denied. 105 S.Ct. 1373
(1985), was denied a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court February 25, 1985, only one
month before hearing the National Gay Task Force case. Homosexuality was the central issue of this case
also, dealing specifically with the issue of the "rights of public employees to maintain and express their
private sexual preferences." Rowland, 105 S.Ct. 1373. A non-tenured teacher was suspended from her high
school guidance counseling position in December of 1974 and did not have her contract renewed in April of
1975 solely because she was bisexual. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the school district's deci-
sion to not renew the teacher's contract could not be objected to on a first amendment basis because the
teacher's speech was not about "a matter of public concern." Rowland, 730 F.2d at 45 1. The court also held
that the teacher did not have an equal protection claim because the teacher did not present evidence of "how
other employees with different sexual preferences were treated." Id. When the writ of certiorari was denied,
Justice Brennan with whom Justice Marshall joined, wrote a dissenting opinion stating reasons why cer-
tiorari should have been granted. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Id. at 1379.
6Id.
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both the challengers and the defenders of the Oklahoma statute claiming vic-
tory.'
The NGTF claims that although the portion of the statute which pro-
hibits teachers from advocating or promoting homosexuality in the classroom
has been upheld, four members of the Supreme Court have demonstrated that
laws which silence all speech about homosexuality will not be upheld.' The
Board of Education of Oklahoma City will probably lobby to have the
Oklahoma legislature pass a new law which will not infringe upon the constitu-
tional rights of homosexual teachers
FACTS
In 1978, the Oklahoma legislature enacted a statute" which provided for
the dismissal or suspension of teachers engaging in homosexual activity or con-
duct. This statute attempted to regulate not only teachers, but any teaching-
related employee, that is, one who comes in continual contact with school
children." Also, the statute prohibited all speech relating to the issue of
homosexuality. However, this law was never actually invoked because the
NGTF immediately filed an action in federal court challenging the facial con-
stitutionality of the statute. 2 The NGTF believed that the Oklahoma statute
was "too broad and would inhibit teachers from expressing their views on
'The Washington Post, March 27, 1985, at A2.
8Id.
91d.
'"OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (West Supp. 1984).
A. As used in this section:
1. Public homosexual activity means the commission of an act defined in Section 886 of Title 21 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, if such act is:
a. committed with a person of the same sex, and
b. indiscreet and not practiced in private;
2. "Public homosexual conduct" means advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting
public or private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct
will come to the attention of school children or school employees; and
3. "Teacher" means a person as defined in Section 1-116 of Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
B. In addition to any ground set forth in Section 6-103 of Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes, a teacher, stu-
dent teacher, or a teachers' aide may be refused employment or reemployment, dismissed, or suspended
after a finding that the teacher or teachers' aide has:
I. Engaged in public homosexual conduct or activity; and
2. Has been rendered unfit, because of such conduct or activity, to hold a position as a teacher, student
teacher or a teachers' aide.
C. The following factors shall be considered in making the determination whether the teacher, student
teacher or teachers' aide has been rendered unfit for his position:
I. The likelihood that the activity or conduct may adversely affect students or school employees;
2. The proximity in time and place of the activity or conduct to the teacher's, student teacher's or
teachers' aide's official duties;
3. Any extenuating or aggravating circumstances; and
4. Whether the conduct or activity is of a repeated or continuing nature which tends to encourage or
dispose school children toward similar conduct or activity.
"For the purpose of this note, all employees affected by this statute will be referred to as teachers.
'I2NGTF membership includes teachers in the Oklahoma Public School System. See, National Gay Task
Force, 729 F.2d at 1272.
[Vol. !19:2
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homosexuality."' 3 The district court applied the "material and substantial
disruption test," and held that the statute was constitutional despite the fact
that it reaches protected speech."'
The NGTF appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, contending
that the statute violated the first and fourteenth amendments. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court reversed'5 holding that "the statute, in so far as it punishes homosex-
ual conduct as that phrase is defined in the statute to include advocating...
encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity is unconstitu-
tional."'6 The court added that the unconstitutional portion of the statute was
severable from the portion which proscribes "homosexual activity," thereby
enabling that portion to withstand constitutional attack. 7
An appeal to the United States Supreme Court resulted in a split
decision," and an affirmance of the judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 9 Furthermore, the Court did not order reargument of this case. 0
This note will focus on the opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
and will discuss the Oklahoma statute as it relates to: (1) teachers' right of pri-
vacy; (2) the doctrine of overbreadth; (3) the doctrine of statutory vagueness;
(4) teachers' right to equal protection; and (5) the establishment clause.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy was first recognized as a fundamental right in
Griswold v. Connecticut. " One of the most controversial types of right of
privacy is the right of privacy of sexual intimacy between homosexuals.22 The
right of privacy is defined as a right to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters which fundamentally affect a person.23 The United
"See supra note 7.
14National Gay Task Force. 729 F.2d at 1272-73.
"A three judge panel reversed this decision by a 2-1 vote.
"National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1275.
17Id.
" National Gay Task Force, 105 S.Ct. 1858 (1985). Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case
because of illness.
"The tie vote, 4-4, caused the Supreme Court to affirm the Tenth Circuit Court's decision. Because of this
affirmance, the Supreme Court ruling does not serve as a precedent for other cases. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188 (1972). No Supreme Court opinion was written.
"It could be that Justice Powell did not want to take part in this decision. The Court ordered reargument on
three other cases which resulted in a tie during Justice Powell's absence.
21381 U.S. 479 (1965). The director and a doctor of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut were
convicted as assessories in violation of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Ap-
pellants distributed contraceptives to married couples. The Court held the statute unconstitutional as it in-
vaded the right to marital privacy. Id. at 486.
nSee People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S. 2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981); National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d 1270; See generally, Blackburn, Human Rights in an Inter-
national Context: Recognizing the Right of Intimate Association, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1982). This note
discusses the right of privacy in all types of human relationships.
3Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
Fall, 19851
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States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade24 stated that governmental intrusion in-
to a person's life is permissible only when the state proves that the governmen-
tal intrusion is warranted.25 In Whalen v. Roe, 26 the Supreme Court set out the
interests protected by the constitutional right of privacy." The Tenth Circuit
Court" applied the standards set out in Baker v. Wade,29 People v. Onofre t°
and Lovisi v. Slayton3 when determining whether a teacher's right of privacy
is violated by the Oklahoma statute.
In Baker v. Wade,32 Donald Baker, a homosexual, brought suit attacking
the constitutionality of a Texas statute33 which proscribed deviate sexual inter-
course between persons of the same sex. Donald Baker contended that accord-
ing to the Texas statute, his behavior was criminal, but that the same kind of
sexual behavior which the Texas statute defines as "deviate" is protected by
the constitutional right of privacy, when practiced by married couples.
Recognizing that "the right of privacy protects individuals' decisions concern-
ing marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, and family relationships -
and that any government regulation upon such fundamental rights may be
justified only by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interest at stake,"3 the court held that there is a
right of privacy to private sexual conduct between consenting adults. 5
In People v. Onofre, 3 6 Ronald Onofre was convicted of violating a New
York statute37 which made consensual sodomy a crime. The court recognized
2410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
251d. at 154.
21429 U.S. 589 (1977).
271d. at 599 n. 24.
(I) the right to be free from governmental intrusions into a person's private affairs;
(2) protection from involuntary exposure of a person's private affairs; and
(3) freedom from governmental compulsion into a person's actions, thoughts, experiences and beliefs.
"National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273.
1553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
3051 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). See generally,
Schwartz, Consensual Sodomy and the Choice of a Moral Doctrine: New York's Permissive Position, 5 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 75 (1983); Katz, Sexual Morality and the Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46 ALB. L. REV.
311 (1982); Note, Constitutional Law, 20 J. FAM. L. 174 (1981-82); Wolff, Expanding the Right of Sexual
Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REV. 1279 (1981). All articles discuss Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980).
31539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
11553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
3Id. at 1124. "A person commits an offense if he [or she] engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex. Deviate sexual intercourse means any contact between any part of the genitals of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person. A violation of this statute is a class C misdemeanor,
punishable only by a fine not to exceed $200." Id.
'ld. at 1135.
"Id. at 1148.
3651 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
"Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (198 1). "A person is guil-
ty of consensual sodomy when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person. Deviate sexual
(Vol. 19:2
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that when acts such as those defined by the New York consensual sodomy
statute are done in private, there is no rational basis for prohibiting such acts if
they are done voluntarily by consenting adults.
In Lovisi v. Slayton,38 a married couple was convicted of violating a
Virginia sodomy statute. 9 Mr. and Mrs. Lovisi placed an advertisement in a
magazine to solicit a third sexual partner. Pictures were taken of the three per-
sons engaging in sexual activity in the Lovisi's home. Some of the photographs
showed Mrs. Lovisi performing fellatio upon her husband and another male.
Later, Mrs. Lovisi's two minor daughters saw the photographs. Mr. and Mrs.
Lovisi challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia sodomy statute claiming
that the statute violated their right to sexual privacy in a marital relationship.
40
The court denied this challenge, stating that once a married couple admits
strangers into their bedroom to share in their sexual intimacy, then the con-
stitutional protection of privacy is dissolved. The court recognized that couples
have the freedom to choose their own degree of privacy, but when couples
begin to allow "onlookers, whether they are close friends, chance acquain-
tances, observed 'peeping Toms' or paying customers, they may not exclude
the state as a constitutionally forbidden intruder."'"
The Constitution protects the private sexual behavior of consenting
adults provided the sexual behavior takes place in private. Since the Oklahoma
statute does not punish acts performed in private, the court reasoned that there
was not even an implication of a violation of the right of privacy. 2
After failing to prove that the first amendment right of privacy was
violated by the statute, the NGTF attempted to prove that the statute violated
another first amendment protection, the right to advocate a particular ideal, by
proving that the Oklahoma statute was overbroad.
OVERBREADTH
A statute may be challenged as overbroad when it overreaches into con-
stitutionally protected activities while lawfully restraining unprotected ac-
tivities. When considering a facial challenge of a statute based upon over-
intercourse means sexual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact between
the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vulva." Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938,
434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
3539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
391d. at 350. "If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any male
or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or
she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than
three years."
'"Id. at 351.
'lid.
'
2National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273. The constitution protects consensual, non-commercial sexual
acts in private between adults. The dissenting opinion does not address the right of privacy issue. This por-
tion of the Tenth Circuit Court's ruling was not appealed and was not before the Supreme Court. The New
York Times, March 27, 1985, at 23.
RECENT CASESFall, 19851
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breadth, the courts proceed cautiously for fear that the invalidation of a
statute may interfere unnecessarily with a state regulatory program. 3
Therefore, a court will not totally invalidate a statute unless it is not "readily
subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts and its deterrent effect
on legitimate expression is both real and substantial.""
Because of the courts' reluctance to invalidate a statute or a part of a
statute unless it unconstitutionally limits expression, the Tenth Circuit Court
invalidated only the part of the Oklahoma statute that it found was overbroad.
The Oklahoma statute provided punishment for "public homosexual con-
duct." 3 Public homosexual conduct is defined as "advocating, soliciting, im-
posing, encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a
manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the atten-
tion of school children or school employees."' Advocacy is protected by the
first amendment unless the advocacy of a particular ideal results in an immi-
nent lawless action. 7
The Tenth Circuit Court recognized that "encouraging" and
"promoting," like "advocating," do not imply a threat of imminent action. 8
Thus, the court struck down Section B of the statute, claiming that it was
severable from the remaining portion of the statute.49 A teacher who advocates
the repeal of an antisodomy statute via the local media would be violating Sec-
tion B of the statute, because there would be a substantial risk of the statement
coming to the attention of school children. Such statements are protected by
the first amendment of the Constitution. ° It would be unfair and unconstitu-
tional to require all teachers to restrict their expression."'
The dissenting judge, Judge Barrett, did not agree on this point. He stated
that
[any teacher who advocates, solicits, encourages or promotes the practice
of sodomy in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct
will come to the attention of school children or school employees is in fact
and in truth inciting school children to participate in the abominable and
detestable crime against nature. 2
'Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
"Id.
"See supra note 9.
Id.
'Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). "The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of . . . law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id.
at 447.
'National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274.
9 Id.
"ld.
51Id.
52National Gay Task Force. 729 F.2d at 1276; see Baker, 553 F. Supp. 1121. "At least 5% of American
[Vol. 19:2
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Judge Barrett further stated that advocacy of homosexuality is considered in-
citing because it has the possibility of coming to the attention of school
children .
The NGTF claimed victory on the first amendment overbreadth issue,
but made another first amendment challenge charging that the Oklahoma
statute violated the establishment clause.
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The establishment clause" of the first amendment requires the govern-
ment to not aid or establish a religion. When a law is challenged by the
establishment clause, it must pass a three prong test:
(1) it must have a secular purpose;
(2) it must have a primary secular effect; and
(3) it must not involve the government in excessive entanglement with
religion."
A statute does not violate the establishment clause if it has a secular pur-
pose, if its primary effect does not advance or inhibit religion, and if it does not
promote an excessive entanglement with religion.56 The Supreme Court had
held that a statute does not violate the establishment clause because it "hap-
pens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions."57
The Tenth Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the district court, stating
that the Oklahoma statute does not violate the establishment clause. 8 Since
the statute did not espouse one particular form of religion it was irrelevant that
it happened to harmonize with the beliefs of some or all religions. The
Oklahoma statute thus did not violate the establishment clause.
After exhausting all issues challenging that the statute violates the first
amendment, the NGTF challenged the statute on fourteenth amendment
grounds.
VOID FOR VAGUENESS
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc." detailed
males are exclusive or obligatory homosexuals - those who have no heterosexual experiences and no desire
to change. Obligatory homosexuality is not a matter of choice: it is fixed at an early age. The overwhelming
majority of experts agree that individuals become homosexuals because of biological or genetic factors, or
environmental conditioning, or a combination of these causes." Id. at It 29; "There is no basis to assume
that criminal laws ... reduce the number of homosexuals." Id. at 1130.
"National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1277.
-"U.S. CONST. amend. I, supra note 2.
"NOWAK. ROTUNDA. YOUNG. HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 851 (1978).
',Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319, reh'gdenied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
"National Gay Task Force. 729 F.2d at 1273.
"455 U.S. 489, rehg denied, 456 U.S. 950 (1980).
RECENT CASESFall, 1985]
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the standards for the unconstitutionality of a statute based upon vagueness.
A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and
therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on
its face as unduly vague in violation of due process. To succeed, however,
the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in
all of its applications."
The NGTF challenged that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment"'
by infringing upon the plaintiff's right to due process. In an inquiry into this
issue, the court must first determine whether the statute reaches a "substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct." 2 Only if the statute is not over-
broad may the court examine the statute for vagueness. 3 To succeed on a
vagueness claim, the plaintiff must prove that the statute is "impermissibly
vague in all of its applications."" A person who takes part in conduct which is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as it is applied
to the conduct of others."
The NGTF attempted to prove that the Oklahoma statute was impermis-
sibly vague as it is applied to public homosexual activity.6 The Tenth Circuit
Court rejected the void for vagueness argument because the NGTF made "no
showing '6 7 that the statute was impermissibly vague. Cases68 in Oklahoma
have clearly defined what acts the Oklahoma Crime Against Nature 9 pro-
scribes."
Although the NGTF did not succeed with its void for vagueness claim, it
challenged the Oklahoma statute on another fourteenth amendment claim, the
right to equal protection.
l'id. at 497.
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States: nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law: nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
62 Village of Hoffman Estates. 455 U.S. at 494.
'lid. at 495.
'Id. at 497. This is accomplished by first examining the plaintiff's conduct and then analyzing other
hypothetical applications of the law.
11Id. at 495. Vagueness must be determined according to the circumstances of each case.
"National Gay Task Force. 729 F.2d at 1273.
- Id.
" Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558 (OkI. Crim. App.), appealdismised. 350 U.S. 878 (1955). Abominable and
detestable crimes against nature "include not only sodomy as defined at common law but all unnatural sex-
ual copulation. including oral genital contact, or fellatio." Id. at 563.
"OKLA. STAr. tit. 21, § 886 (1910). "Every person who is guilty of the detestable and abominable crime
against nature, committed with mankind or with a beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary
not exceeding ten (10) years."
'Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), held that a similar Florida statute was not void for vagueness
because Florida courts had specified that the statute applied to both oral and anal copulation.
[Vol. 19:2
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EQUAL PROTECTION
The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution 71 concerns
the legality of statutory classifications of persons. This requires that in-
dividuals be treated in a manner similar to others. The requirement of the
equal protection guarantee is met if the statutory classification is rationally
related to valid statutory purposes."
The Tenth Circuit Court held that the NTGF's guarantee to equal protec-
tion was not violated by the Oklahoma statute. 73 The United States Supreme
Court has not recognized that homosexuals, or a classification based upon
choice of sexual partners, as a suspect class.7" The court was reluctant to
recognize homosexuals as a suspect class because in Frontiero v. Richardson75
only four members of the Supreme Court accepted gender as a suspect
classification. 7 A law which creates an inherently suspect class is subject to the
strict scrutiny test77 when it limits fundamental 8 constitutional rights. The ra-
tional relationship to legitimate state purposes test 9 is applied when a fun-
damental right or suspect class is not involved."
Therefore, the court applied "something less than a strict scrutiny test."',
Relying upon Ambach v. Norwick,82 the court found that the state govern-
ment has a compelling interest in not allowing public homosexuals or public
advocacy of homosexuality to influence school children. 3 "Surely a school
may fire a teacher for engaging in an indiscreet public act of oral or anal inter-
I'See supra note 6 1.
"Sustein, Public Values Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 130 (1982).
This note discusses the history of equal protection cases and the various tests which are applied to equal pro-
tection cases.
"National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273.
""Suspect" classifications are those based upon: gender, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I 1(1967); national
origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948);.
"Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
"National Gay Task Force. 729 F.2d at 1273.
"The strict scrutiny test requires the government to show that it is pursuing a compelling end, the value of
which is so great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental values.
"Recognized fundamental rights are sex, child rearing, child bearing and marriage.
"The rational relationship test questions whether the classification bears a rational relationship to an end of
the government which is not prohibited by the Constitution. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976).
$'Baker, 533 F. Supp. at 1273.
"National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273.
"2441 U.S. 68 (1979). This case held that a law forbidding certification of a public school teacher because the
applicant is not a United States citizen does not violate the equal protection clause because public school
teachers come within governmental function principle such that the law bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest.
""Public education, like the police function, fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its con-
stituency. The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens and
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions." Id.
at 76.
Fall, 19851
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course.""
When considering whether a violation of the equal protection clause has
been made, the court must consider whether the state has an interest in up-
holding the statute which is more compelling than the group. or class of persons
whose rights are being infringed. In National Gay Task Force,8" the interests
that the court balanced were the state's interest in protecting school children
against the teachers' interest in their first and fourteenth amendment rights.
STATE'S INTEREST IN REGULATING TEACHERS' SPEECH
The majority and the minority of the court differed in opinion over the
issue of the state's interest in regulating teachers' speech. The majority con-
tended that the "state's interest outweigh a teacher's interest only when the ex-
pression results in a material or substantial interference or disruption in the
normal activities of the school." 6 Teachers nor students "shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.""7 In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,"8 the Supreme
Court noted that fear or apprehension of disturbance is not great enough to
overcome the constitutional right to freedom of speech. 9 To justify the pro-
hibition of speech, the state must show "something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanies an un-
popular viewpoint." ° The Supreme Court has held that a teacher's first amend-
ment rights may be limited only if the state proves that "some restriction is
necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to ensure effective
performance""' by the teacher.
The minority opinion, however, vehemently disagrees. 2 Oklahoma
enacted this statute to protect its school children and teachers from any
teacher who engages in public homosexual conduct or activity.93 "To equate
such 'restraint' on first amendment (sic) speech with the Tinker armband
display and to require proof that advocacy of the act of sodomy will substan-
tially interfere or disrupt normal school activities is a bow to permissiveness."94
'National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273.
"Id. at 1270.
"Id. at 1274.
"Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
uld.
"Id. at 508.
"Id. at 509.
"National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d 1270. "It is fundamental that the state legislative bodies, in the exer-
cise of state police power, may enact reasonable regulations in the interest of public health, safety, morals
and welfare over persons within state limits." Id. at 1275.
921d.
93Id.
"ld. at 1277.
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JUSTICE POWELL'S ABSENCE
Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the decision of
this case because he was unable to hear oral argument" due to illness. 6 A tie
resulted with the Court sharply divided four to four. 7 Justice Powell's absence
and the tie vote caused the Court to affirm the Tenth Circuit Court's opinion.
Because no Supreme Court opinion was written, the views of the remaining
members of the Court are also unavailable.
If Justice Powell had voted, National Gay Task Force99 would have had
precedential value and would have provided a cornerstone for subsequent
litigation which has homosexuality as its central issue.'1° It is impossible to
definitely determine what the outcome of the case would have been if Justice
Powell was able to participate in the decision, but a prediction can be made by
reviewing Justice Powell's personal background and by reading his opinions.'
Justice Powell's experience makes him attentive to school related issues
and issues affecting education. As an advocate of education, Justice Powell
served on the Richmond Public School Board for nine years and on the
Virginia State Board of Education for one year. 02
In Plyler v. Doe,'03 a Texas law enabled the state to withhold from local
school districts any state funds for the education of children who were illegal
aliens and allowed local school districts to deny enrollment in public school to
children who were illegal aliens. The children of illegal aliens challenged the
Texas statute on the basis that it violated their right to equal protection of the
law. The Court recognized that these children were entitled to equal protection
of the law even though they are illegal aliens and are not members of a
recognized suspect class."'
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion recognizing that although il-
legal alien children are not a suspect class, "Ithey are excluded only because of
a status resulting from the violation by parents or guardians of our immigra-
"See supra note 7.
"Justice Powell missed oral argument in 56 cases due to recovery from surgery for prostrate cancer in
January of 1985.
11105 S.Ct. 1858 (1985).
"See supra, note 19.
"729 F.2d 1270.
"'See supra, note 19.
"' Because the right of privacy was not in issue before the Supreme Court, the following discussion is based
upon Justice Powell's previous opinions about the equal protection clause.
"'Oaks, Tribute to Lewis F Powell, Jr., 68 VA. L. REV. 161 (1982).
"Colleagues who worked with Lewis Powell on the school boards of Richmond and the State of
Virginia during the stressful desegregation battles of the sixties have described how all of his personal
relations were permeated with his sense of fairness and consideration for others, his compassion, and
his respect for the dignity of the human personality." Id. at 162.
03457 U.S. 202 (1982), rehg denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
''Id. at 230.
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tion laws and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully." 105 He fur-
ther states that a legislative classification that has the potential to create an
underclass of citizens cannot be reconciled with the equal protection clause.'
Because Texas' denial of education to the illegal alien children had no substan-
tial relationship to any substantial state interest, Justice Powell concurred in
striking down the statute.' °7
In Frontiero v. Richardson,'° a married female Air Force officer
challenged a statute which solely for administrative convenience made spouses
of male members of uniformed services dependents for the purposes of obtain-
ing larger living space and larger medical allowances. Spouses of female
members were not considered dependents under this statute unless the officer's
husband was dependent upon his wife for more than half of his support. The
Court concluded that a classification based upon sex is inherently suspect"°
and held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment was violated."'
Justice Powell concurred in this judgment, but did not agree that all classifica-
tions based upon sex are inherently suspect."' Since the passage of the equal
rights amendment was pending at the time, he believed that the legislature
should create a new suspect class."'
Justice Powell's reluctance to create an inherently suspect classification in
Plyler 3 and Frontiero" probably would have been demonstrated in National
Gay Task Force."' He would probably have applied something less than a
strict scrutiny test to NGTF. Justice Powell's fundamental belief in education
and its importance in American society probably would have caused him to
side with the view demonstrated in Ambach"6 and affirm the view of the
Tenth Circuit Court.
CONCLUSION
National Gay Task Force" 7 poses a. perplexing problem. The difficulty lies
in evaluating at what point the teachers' expression becomes so disruptive as to
1111d. at 238.
1"id. at 239.
17 Id.
1-411 U.S. 677 (1973).
'" ld. at 688.
"Ild at 690-91.
'"Id. at 691.
"'Id. at 692.
"'Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
"'Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677.
"'National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d 1270.
"'Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76.
"'National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d 1270.
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warrant the state's interference with the teachers' right to free speech.
Although National Gay Task Force"' upheld the portion of the statute allow-
ing teacher dismissal for public homosexuality, it did show that some Justices
of the Supreme Court are willing to affirm laws that inhibit the freedoms of
homosexual teachers. Harvard Law Professor, Laurence Tribe, the attorney
who argued the case on behalf of the NGTF before the United States Supreme
Court said, "lilt is a signal that there will be no green light from this Court for
laws silencing speech about homosexuality."" 9
SUSAN M. FITCH
"lid.
"'See supra note 7.
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